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1 Bilkent University, Department of Mathematics
acan@fen.bilkent.edu.tr
2 Bilkent University, Department of Computer Engineering
{kamer,selcuk}@cs.bilkent.edu.tr
Abstract. One of the fundamental problems of public key cryptography
is protecting the private key. Private keys are too long to be remembered
by the user, and storing them in the device which performs the private
key operation is insecure as long as the device is subject to capture. In
this paper, we propose server-assisted protocols for the ElGamal signa-
ture scheme which make the system capture resilient in the sense that
the security of the system is not compromised even if the signature de-
vice is captured. The protocols also have a key disabling feature which
allows a user to disable the device’s private key in case both the device
and the password of the user are compromised simultaneously.
1 Introduction
In public key cryptosystems, protecting the private key is a crucial problem. The
keys are too long to be remembered by the users, and the devices which perform
the private key operations may be subject to capture. This problem is even more
significant if the device is a mobile authentication token such as a smart card or
a hand-held device. An intuitive solution to this problem would be keeping the
private key encrypted with the user’s password in the device. However, in that
case an offline dictionary attack on the password may be sufficient to obtain the
private key if the device is captured, since the password by its very nature is a
weak secret.
To make the devices resilient to capture, the private key can be stored in a
server and the device can download it whenever a private-key operation is to
be performed. To ensure that only the legitimate user can transfer the private
key, an authentication to the server with the user’s password is also required.
However, the server itself has to be trusted and it must also be not subject to
compromise in this solution.
MacKenzie and Reiter [4] avoided the requirement of a trusted server with
a neat solution and gave a generic protocol framework to achieve capture re-
silience with different public key crpytosystems. They extended their technique
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to develop RSA based signature [7] and ElGamal based decryption [2] protocols.
The protocols also supported a key disabling feature if the device and the user’s
password are both compromised simultaneously.
What has been remarkably missing in the literature has been a capture re-
silient solution for ElGamal based signature systems [2]. ElGamal is the most
commonly used signature algorithm after RSA, and it is especially significant
for being the underlying algorithm of NIST’s Digital Signature Standard [5].
Its elliptic curve versions are particularly popular in smart card authentication
applications. In this paper, we extend the work of MacKenzie and Reiter to the
ElGamal signature protocols and show how capture resilience can be achieved in
the systems which use this algorithm for authentication. We consider two differ-
ent versions of the ElGamal signature algorithm and present a capture resilient
protocol for each of them.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we summarize
the related background. After explaining the notation and the framework in Sec-
tion 3, we present the capture resilient ElGamal signature protocols in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes the paper with ideas for future research.
2 Background
The problem of using public key authentication techniques where the users are
able to remember only weak passwords has been studied in the literature for
several years. Capture resilience is an important feature of such techniques since
the devices are subject to being captured. Obviously, if the private key of a
device is stored in the device, the system would not be capture resilient. In
1999, Perlman and Kaufman [6] designed a strong password protocol where the
private key is not stored in the device and downloaded from the server when
needed. This idea requires an additional authentication mechanism which uses
only a weak password to ensure that the private key is downloaded only by the
legitimate user.
The idea of storing the private key in the server can also be used for obtaining
capture resilience. However, storing the private key of the device in the server is
secure only if the server is trusted and not subject to compromise. It is obvious
that by capturing the server, an adversary can mount an offline dictionary attack
even if the private key is encrypted with the weak password. MacKenzie and
Reiter [4] solved this problem by storing a ticket in the device which includes
the private key information. This ticket is encrypted with the public key of the
server and contains the private key information encrypted with the password.
Based on this idea, they proposed a generic private key retrieval protocol which
does not require the server to be trusted.
MacKenzie and Reiter extended their ideas in the generic private key retrieval
protocol and proposed RSA-based signature and ElGamal-based decryption pro-
tocols which supported capture resilience and also key disabling. Key disabling
preserves the security of the system in case that the device is captured and the
user password is compromised. In that case, the legitimate user can disable his
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private key by sending a request to the server and, if this request is valid, the
server will ignore future signature/decryption requests with tickets associated
with the old private key. To achieve capture resilience, MacKenzie and Reiter
proposed to divide the private key information into two. The first one, the server’s
share, is encrypted with the public key of the server and stored in the device
whereas the second one is produced from the password and a random number
stored in the device. The protocols proposed in [4] are secure if one of the device
or the server is compromised alone; however, if both are compromised simulta-
neously, the password can be broken by a dictionary attack and the private key
can be obtained.
3 Framework
In our framework, the device and the server are connected through a public
network where the attackers are able to eavesdrop and inject messages. Both
the device and the server has a public-private key pair, (PKdvc, SKdvc), and
(PKsvr, SKsvr), respectively. We use E and D to denote the public key en-
cryption and decryption operations with these keys. The legitimate user of the
device creates a valid ElGamal signature for a message m by cooperation with
the server. The cooperation is needed since the device cannot use SKdev without
the help from the server. The security of the signing operation is provided by a
user password denoted by π.
We follow the attack and adversary models of MacKenzie and Reiter [4] where
there are various adversary types. Each adversary type is assumed to be able to
control the network, so an adversary can read all the messages going through
the network and control the inputs to the device and the server. In addition,
an adversary can capture a subset of {π, dvc, svr} and learn all of the static
contents of the captured resources. The type of an adversary is specified with
respect to a capture set S ⊂ {π, dvc, svr} where ADV (S) denotes an adversary
who captured the components in S.
Here we give the definition and notation for the ElGamal signature schemes
used in the proposed protocol:
3.1 ElGamal Signatures
Let g be a generator of Z∗p where p is a large prime. The private key is SKdvc = x
where gcd(x, p−1) = 1. The public key is PKdvc = (y, g, p) where y = g
x mod p.
To sign a message m, the signer chooses a random ephemeral key k such that
gcd(k, p−1) = 1 and computes r = gk mod p. Then he computes the signature s
by using a cryptographic hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → Zp and sends σ = (r, s) as
the signature. The receiver can verify the signature by checking an equation in
modulo p. A detailed discussion of the ElGamal signature scheme can be found
in [2].
There are several variants of the ElGamal signature algorithm where s is de-
fined differently [3]. Two important variants used in our protocols are as follows:
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1. In the first variant, the signature is computed as
s = xr + kh(m) mod (p− 1)
and the verification equation is
gs
?
= yrrh(m) mod p.
2. In the second one, the signature is computed as
s = xh(m) + kr mod (p− 1)
and the verification equation is
gs
?
= yh(m)rr mod p.
4 Capture Resilient ElGamal Signature Protocols
In this section, we propose two capture resilient signature protocols for the El-
Gamal signature algorithm. The protocols proposed here are based on the ideas
in [4] but differ significantly in the details since the distribution techniques of
MacKenzie and Reiter do not apply due to the significantly different nature of
the ElGamal signature algorithm. In our protocol, the private key of the user is
shared between the server and the device. When a user wants to sign a message
m, the device, which was previously initialized with π by the legitimate user,
signs m by cooperation with the server. At the first step of our protocol, the
device is authenticated to the server with π and sends the server’s share of the
private key x with m. One part of the signature is computed by the server with
its share of x. Upon receiving the partial signature from the server, the device
computes the other part with its share which is produced from π.
As mentioned above, proposed protocols also support a key disabling oper-
ation when both π and dvc are compromised. Disabling a key means sending
a message to the server to ignore the future requests with the corresponding
private key. Hence, the adversary cannot forge signatures by cooperation with
the server after key disabling.
We present the details of the protocol in two phases. The first phase is the
device initialization phase where the required data for the protocols are generated
in the device. Some of these data are stored in the device and some are deleted
immediately. The second phase is the signature protocol where the device signs
a message with the help of the server. After introducing the signature protocols,




The static data required for the protocols is produced in the device initialization
phase. The notation A ←R B denotes that A is randomly chosen from the
elements of B with a uniform distribution. In the proposed protocols, random
numbers are chosen from κ-bit numbers where κ can be considered as a security









x1 ← f(v, π)
x2 ← x− x1 mod (p− 1)
τ ← EPKsvr (a, b, u, x2, g, p)
The values t and u are computed to be used in the key disabling phase. The
random number a is chosen to be used in generating the message authentication
codes(MAC). The function f takes two arguments and computes x1 ∈ Zp, the
device’s share of x. The ticket τ , which contains x2, the server’s share of x, is
encrypted with PKsvr to guarantee that an adversary cannot see the share. The
values v, a, t and τ are stored on the device and, u, b, x, x1, x2 and π are deleted
from the device immediately after the device initialization.
4.2 Signature Protocol
The device starts this phase with the values stored in the device initialization
phase, the password π and the message m to be signed by using the private key x
of the device. The two variants of our protocols are illustrated in Fig.1 and Fig.2.
These protocols differ only in the signature equation, hence the notation used
in both is same. To start the protocol the device first chooses two κ-bit random
numbers ρ and k1 and then computes β, the hash of π. Then r1 = g
k1 mod p
is computed to generate r used in the ElGamal signature scheme described in
the previous section. The protocol message γ is obtained by encrypting m, β,
ρ and r1 with PKsvr and sent to the server with the ticket τ and a MAC
δ = maca(γ, τ).
Upon receiving γ, δ and τ , server first checks if the messages and the password
π used by the device are authentic. Then it chooses a random number k2 and
computes r2 = g
k2 mod p. Note that k1 and k2 are random numbers whose sum,
k, is the ephemeral key used in the ElGamal signature scheme. After computing
r, the server computes the partial signature s2 and sends them to the device by










γ ← EPKsvr (m, β, ρ, r1)
δ ← maca(γ, τ )
γ,δ,τ
→
(a, b, u, x2, g, p)← DSKsvr (τ )
abort if maca(γ, τ ) 6= δ
(m,β, ρ, r1)← DSKsvr (γ)
abort if β 6= b




r← r1r2 mod p
s2 ← (x2r + k2h(m)) mod (p− 1)
η ← ρ⊕ s2
η,r
←
s2 ← ρ⊕ η
x1 ← f(v, π)
s1 ← (x1r + k1h(m)) mod (p− 1)
s← (s1 + s2) mod (p− 1)
abort if gs 6= yrrh(m)
return (r, s)










γ ← EPKsvr (m, β, ρ, r1)
δ ← maca(γ, τ )
γ,δ,τ
→
(a, b, u, x2, g, p)← DSKsvr (τ )
abort if maca(γ, τ ) 6= δ
(m,β, ρ, r1)← DSKsvr (γ)
abort if β 6= b




r← r1r2 mod p
s2 ← (x2h(m) + k2r) mod (p− 1)
η ← ρ⊕ s2
η,r
←
s2 ← ρ⊕ η
x1 ← f(v, π)
s1 ← (x1h(m) + k1r) mod (p− 1)
s← (s1 + s2) mod (p− 1)
abort if gs 6= yh(m)rr
return (r, s)
Fig. 2. Capture resilient ElGamal signature protocol, the 2nd variant: s = xh(m) + kr
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When the device gets r and η = s2⊕ρ, it computes his partial signature and
combines it with the one sent by the server. Then it checks the validity of s and
outputs the signature if it is valid.
4.3 Key Disabling
It is obvious that an adversary ADV {dvc, π} can forge signatures by imperson-
ating the user of the device. In the proposed protocols, the legitimate user has
a key disabling option to disable his private key in these cases. To start the
key disabling mechanism, the legitimate user sends τ and t to the server, hence
these values must be kept offline. Upon receiving a disabling request, the server
decrypts the ticket and checks if u
?
= hdsbl(t) where hdsbl is a hash function. If
the equality holds, server puts τ to the disabled list and refuses to respond to
requests with this ticket.
4.4 Security Analysis
As stated earlier, the device is connected to a server through a public network
and adversaries are able to see and control the messages to the device and the
server. Here we discuss the security of the proposed protocols against four types
of adversaries:
1. ADV {dvc}: This adversary captured the device, but cannot initiate the pro-
tocol since he does not know π. However, he can perform an online guessing
attack to find π by observing the responses of the server to his invocations.
The success probability of this attack is simply q/|D| where D is the pass-
word space and q is the number of invocations. Given that only a negligible
fraction of the password space can be tried in an online guessing attack, the
system is secure against this type of attack.
The only information the adversary can obtain by eavesdropping is the sig-
nature of a message m since all the messages are encrypted. He can obtain
neither the partial signatures nor any other information related to them.
2. ADV {π, svr}: This adversary type has all the static data stored in the server
and has also obtained the password. He knows the public values PKdvc, g,
p and PKsvr. Furthermore, he knows SKsvr; so he can decrypt the ticket
τ and find the values a, b, u and x2. He can also obtain r1, ρ, and m by
decrypting γ.
For this type of adversary, obtaining the private key x is equivalent to ob-
taining x1. Having π is not sufficient for an offline dictionary attack since
v is also required, which is unknown to the adversary. By eavesdropping or
impersonating the server, he can obtain valid s2 values for a valid signature
s. The partial signature of the device, s1, can be computed by subtracting
s2 from s. However, s1 is not sufficient to obtain x1 since k1 is also required
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but it is an unknown for the adversary. Note that k1 cannot be obtained
from r1 because this is equivalent to the discrete log problem.
3. ADV {dvc, svr}: If all components of the system are broken but the pass-
word π, the attacker can always try to find π by an offline dictionary attack.
In this case, the dictionary attack will be done by comparing the hash of the
password guess to b, which can be obtained by decrypting the ticket. If the
password is broken, the attacker can forge signatures.
If the password is not broken, obtaining the private key x will be equivalent
to obtaining x1 for this type of adversary. By eavesdropping or impersonat-
ing the server, he can obtain a valid partial signature of the server, s2, for
a valid signature s so he can also obtain s1. However, these values are not
sufficient to obtain x1 because similar to the ADV {π, svr} this adversary
type suffers from the lack of k1 which is an unknown to the adversary.
4. ADV {π, dvc}: If the device and the password are compromised simultane-
ously, the attacker will be virtually indistinguishable from the legitimate user
and can forge signatures by cooperation with the server until the legitimate
user of the device disables his private key. For this type of adversary, obtain-
ing the private key is equivalent to obtaining x2. With a procedure similar
to the ones above, this adversary can obtain s1 and s2 for a valid signature
s however he still suffers from the lack of k2 to obtain x2.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed two ElGamal based signature protocols for capture
resilient devices. It is obvious that storing the private keys in the device make the
devices vulnerable to capture. Encrypting the private key with a weak password
is also insufficient since an offline dictionary attack can always be performed once
the device is captured. In this paper, we extended the approach of MacKenzie and
Reiter [4] to the ElGamal signature scheme which is the fundamental of many
important systems. The proposed protocols provide a server assisted solution for
ElGamal-based authentication which makes the systems resilient to capture of
the devices.
Future work on this problem may include a formal security analysis of the
proposed protocols possibly using the random oracle model [1]. Techniques used
by MacKenzie and Reiter [4] to prove the security of their protocols for RSA sig-
nature and ElGamal decryption protocols do not directly apply to the ElGamal
signature scheme due to the more involved structure of the latter. A formal proof
of a similar nature may be possible but would require more creative approaches
with the random oracle model.
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